Mugabe: Liberation hero turned despot

Saturday, 17 December 2016 22:32 Written by

 

Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe speaks at the party's annual conference on December 17, 2016 in Masvingo
Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe speaks at the party's annual conference on December 17, 2016 in Masvingo (AFP Photo/Jekesai NJIKIZANA)
 
Harare (AFP) - Zimbabwe's veteran leader Robert Mugabe once quipped that he'd rule his country until he turned 100.
 
On Saturday, his ruling ZANU-PF party endorsed the 92-year-old leader as its candidate for the 2018 presidential election, bringing him closer to achieving his wish.

From crushing political dissent to ushering in disastrous land reforms that saw the economy crumble, many accuse Mugabe of turning the regional breadbasket into a food importer.

The leader who is currently Africa's oldest president, having clung to office for 36 years, has shown no sign of loosening his grip.

"His real obsession was not with personal wealth but with power," said biographer Martin Meredith.

"Year after year Mugabe sustained his rule through violence and repression -- crushing political opponents, violating the courts, trampling on property rights, suppressing the independent press and rigging elections," said Meredith.

The former political prisoner turned guerrilla leader swept to power in 1980 elections after a growing insurgency and economic sanctions forced the then Rhodesian government to the negotiating table.

He initially won international plaudits for his declared policy of racial reconciliation and for extending improved education and health services to the black majority.

But his lustre faded quickly.

-Tainted leader-

Mugabe, whose party commands most of its support from the ethnic Shona majority, is tainted by the mass killing of the minority Ndebele people in a campaign in the early 1980s known as Gukurahundi, which killed an estimated 20,000 suspected dissidents.

The violence on the Ndebele was unleashed by his North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade.

Yet it was the violent seizure of white-owned farms nearly two decades later that would complete Mugabe's transformation from darling of the West into international pariah -- even if his status as a liberation hero still resonates in most of Africa.

Aimed largely at placating angry war veterans who threatened to destabilise his rule, the land reform policy wrecked the crucial agricultural sector, caused foreign investors to flee and helped plunge the country into economic misery.

At the same time, critics say, Mugabe has clung to power through repression of human rights and by rigging elections.

-Early years-

Born on February 21, 1924, into a Catholic family at Kutama Mission northwest of Harare, Robert Gabriel Mugabe was described as a loner, and a studious child known to carry a book even while tending cattle in the bush.

After his carpenter father walked out on the family when he was 10, the young Mugabe concentrated on his studies, qualifying as a schoolteacher at the age of 17.

An intellectual who initially embraced Marxism, he enrolled at Fort Hare University in South Africa, meeting many of southern Africa's future black nationalist leaders.

After teaching in Ghana, where he was influenced by founder president Kwame Nkrumah, Mugabe returned to Rhodesia where he was detained for his nationalist activities in 1964 and spent the next 10 years in prison camps or jail.

During his incarceration he gained three degrees through correspondence, but the years in prison left their mark.

His four-year-old son by his first wife, Ghanaian-born Sally Francesca Hayfron, died while he was behind bars. Rhodesian leader Ian Smith denied him leave to attend the funeral.

-Health rumours-

In the recent years the aging Mugabe's health has been increasingly under the spotlight, particularly after he fell down a staircase after addressing supporters last year.

He also read a speech to parliament in September apparently unaware that he had delivered the same address a month earlier.

In September he laughed off rumours of his own death, as he returned home from Dubai.

Mugabe, who is banned from travelling to the European Union, regularly travels to Singapore for what is officially called a routine health check-up.

Source-http://news.yahoo.com/mugabe-liberation-hero-turned-despot-201628365.html

 

eritreans-netherlands

This report, commissioned by the Dutch government, describes the activities of the Eritrean regime inside the Netherlands.

It looks at the Eritrean community in the country, describes Eritrean organisations and their activities, and how the government in Asmara exercises control through them.

The report was covered by the main Dutch newspaper, the Telegraph, as: ‘Cabinet wants to put a stop to the long arm of Eritrea.’

Martin


eritreans-netherlandsUnofficial translation of the summary of the report “Niets is wat het lijkt: Eritrese organisaties en integratie”

by the DSP-Groep Amsterdam and Tilburg University

Translated by Klara Smits

 

Summary and conclusions

The Eritrean community in the Netherlands has grown quickly and significantly over the past years and it has a long history and great diversity.
This research addresses the question of how the Eritrean community in the Netherlands is organized and to what extent outside pressure is experienced within the Eritrean community, especially from Eritrea itself. The goal of the research is to gain insight into:

  • the network of Eritrean organisations in the Netherlands;
  • the extent and the nature of the (foreign) control of Eritrean organizations in the Netherlands by the Eritrean government and/or organisations allied to the Eritrean government;
  • the extent and the nature of the pressure that is experienced among Eritreans in the Netherlands, including the payment of financial contributions.

In this summary, the most important findings will be presented and conclusions will be drawn. The method in which the research questions have been examined can be read in chapter 1. The substantiation of the summary and conclusions can be found in chapters 2 to 5.

Reasons for this research

There are concerns over the integration of persons with an Eritrean background in the Netherlands. As  the Eritrean community in the Netherlands is rapidly growing and following the reports in the media about intimidation, the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer) requested a letter to the parliament and a debate in which Eritrea and the influence of Eritrea in the Netherlands could be discussed. The letter was sent to the House of Representatives on June 30th, 2016, by government officials from the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs and Employment and Security and Justice, after which the debate followed. During the parliamentary debate about ‘Eritrea and the influence of Eritrea in the Netherlands’, concerns emerged from the House of Representatives that among others related to the financial contribution of the Netherlands to Eritrea, the diaspora tax, the role of the Eritrean embassy in The Hague in exerting undue pressure, the representatives of the regime in the Netherlands and the lagging integration of Eritreans in the Netherlands.

During the debate of 30 June, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment pledged to have a study carried out among Eritreans in the Netherlands. DSP-groep has executed this research between 21 September and 1 November 2016.
To answer the research questions that emerged from the goals described above, literature research and document research have been executed, four focus group sessions have taken place and a total of 110 interviews were held: 22 with international experts, 21 with Dutch key informants of policy, welfare and support organisations, 6 with lawyers specialised in migration law and who are involved in cases of Eritreans and 61 with people from the Eritrean community of which 20 (former) (board members) from Eritrean organisations. A broad range of people from the Eritrean community has been interviewed, with the goal of incorporating a wide diversity in the research, considering age, gender, religion, political opinion and the timing of emigration to the Netherlands. Both supporters and opponents of the Eritrean regime were interviewed and the ambassador as well as representatives of the embassy were interviewed.

The Eritrean community in the Netherlands

It is estimated that currently 20.000 people with an Eritrean background currently live in the Netherlands. The exact number is hard to pinpoint, because people that were born in Eritrea before its independence in 1993 were officially born in Ethiopia and are often registered as Ethiopian.

The refugees from Eritrea have come to the Netherlands in roughly three waves. In the table below, the characteristics of these migration waves are summarised.

Migration wave Migration context
First wave

(1980-1998)

Approx. 1.500 refugees

A: 1980-1991

Fleeing the independence war (members of the ELF and later of the EPLF; the predecessor of the PFDJ, the party of the current regime)

B. 1991-1998

Fleeing during the reconstruction of Eritrea due to various reasons

Second wave

(1998-2010)

Approx. 6000 refugees

Since the border conflict with Ethiopia

Fleeing the current regime

Third wave

(2010-current)

Approx. 14.0000 refugees

Fleeing the current regime

THE Eritrean community does not exist. There are various religious groups, differences between the regions of origin (highlanders versus lowlanders, urban versus countryside) and different views on the current regime. The impression is kaleidoscopic, due the variety, but also because of the internal contradictions,  A respondent may emphasise opposing the regime in Eritrea and wanting to integrate in the Netherlands as quickly as possible, but another respondent may subsequently swear up and down that the respondent in question – or the organisation that they represent – are actually of an entirely different opinion. Or perhaps one discovers that the representative is in fact not representing the organisation at all. The closer you look, the more it seems that sometimes, nothing is what it seems.
What is clear is that the community is highly polarised: staying neutral or apolitical is difficult. A lot of mistrust exists among people. There is also a lot of fear. Fear and mistrust form a toxic combination that hampers interaction within and outside of the community.

The third wave of refugees that has recently come to the Netherlands is creating changes in the relations. A lot of movement can be seen within the community, partly as a result of the recent reports by the United Nations, the court cases in the Netherlands and the recent coverage of Eritrea.

The description that is given in this report is a snapshot and a principally Dutch snapshot at that, even while the Eritrean community is essentially a transnational community. Refugees from Eritrea have spread across the diasporas of Europe, America, Africa and the Middle-East in the last few decennia. Families are divided between the diaspora and Eritrea. At the same time, the world has quickly diminished in size in the past years. Social media play an important role in maintaining contacts, both in informal contacts as well as in political relations (for supporters and opposition alike). The situation in the Netherlands cannot be seen as separate from the other diasporas nor the situation in Eritrea.

Below, the three main questions and the corresponding sub-questions of the research are answered.

  1. What does the network of Eritrean organisations in the Netherlands look like on an institutional level?

The level of organisation within the Eritrean community is high. A minimum of approximately sixty organisations are active in the Netherlands, organised by and for members of the Eritrean community (see table 1 in the report). They can roughly be sorted into

  • Local organisations;
  • Sport or recreational organisations;
  • Political organisations or movements;
  • Religious organisations;
  • Organisations for specific (religious) groups in the community.

Many of the organisations are not registered at the chamber of commerce as foundation or organisation. Most of the organisations – with the exception of the political movements and organisations that are active in the entire diaspora – are aimed primarily at the local community. Besides these organisations, there are plenty of informal networks and initiatives for meetings and support. The creation and development of the organisations runs parallel to the three migration waves and the spread of the community across the Netherlands.

  1. Which goals do they have, which activities do they carry out, where are they active (in the geographical sense) and who are their members?

The first organisations – mainly local – have been founded by the first refugees and migrants in the large cities (Rotterdam, Amsterdam). They were especially aimed at the creation of connections and raising awareness of the struggle for independence in Eritrea. The focus was mainly on socio-cultural activities. This type of organisation has spread further across the Netherlands and followed the expansion of the community across the Netherlands in this. Later, these organisations started to focus on emancipation of their members, more specifically women. With the recent arrival of the large group of newcomers – refugees from the third migration wave – more initiatives and organisations have sprung up to support this new group of refugees. The activities are mainly aimed at providing information about the Netherlands, about bridging the cultural divide, and offering further support with Dutch language and communication, the building of networks in the Netherlands and the supplying of practical help. Some of these initiatives were taken by the older generations that have been here for a longer period of time and others were taken by the newcomers themselves – often in cooperation with Dutch volunteers.
Most of the organisations have members that pay a contribution and/or pay for taking part in activities. Many organisations receive local subsidies and/or organise fundraising. In addition, there are organisations – often more informal – that organise recreational activities and sports activities. They want to offer an opportunity for coming together through sports and recreation, in order to connect with the Dutch society.

The organisations are often strongly divided along political and religious lines and there are hardly, if any, organisations were polarised groups overlap or meet. In the political sense, the members of the Eritrean community are divided between supporters and opponents of the regime and they are also strongly divided along religious and ethno-religious lines. Supporters of the Eritrean regime associate themselves with the Dutch branch of the PFDJ, the governing party of Eritrea, and with the Youth-PFDJ.
The opposition operates globally and is connected to internationally organised groups that have the goal of improving the situation in Eritrea. Their most important activities are the documentation of human rights violations, the organisation of the opposition, the sharing and spreading of information, the organisation of meetings and demonstrations and advocating their case in politics (from the UN to the chamber of representatives).
Most of the Eritreans in the Netherlands are members of the Eritrean Orthodox church. Additionally, some are members of Protestant, Reformed and Catholic churches and some are members of the Pentecostal church or Jehovah’s Witnesses and others are Muslims. In the last few years, new churches have been formed partly due to the (alleged) infiltration of the Orthodox church by the regime in Eritrea. These opposition churches or neutral churches often work together with for example Dutch churches or Ethiopian Orthodox churches. Characteristic of the third wave of migration is that some of the refugees are highly religious. The members of smaller religious communities have their own communities and/or join the Dutch churches. In the case of a separate Eritrean religious community, this community is usually also in contact with Dutch churches. The Eritrean Muslims mostly join local mosques for their profession of faith. There are, however, a number of organisations specifically aimed at Eritrean Muslims. They provide activities similar to the local organisations.

  1. What (financial) ties to Eritrea, including the Eritrean government, exist and what is the nature of these ties?

The PFDJ is the government party, the only political party that is allowed within Eritrea. The PFDJ is supported by a number of ‘mass organisations’, the National Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW) and the National Union of Youth (NUEY) and Students (NUES/NUEYS). The Youth PFDJ or YPFDJ Holland is a part of the international youth movement that has been founded by the political leader of the PFDJ in Asmara. It is the most active ad visible organisation of the PFDJ. Eri-Blood is the strong-arm squad of the PFDJ.
All of these organisations are under the authority of the PFDJ. They have the explicit political goal to strengthen the PFDJ and to control what happens within the diaspora. The embassy, as official representation of Asmara, is under the control of the PFDJ.
The first local organisations were founded by refugees from the first migration wave that asked for support for the independence struggle. After independence, they have staid – especially in the beginning – loyal to the principles of the PFDJ (the current regime). The majority of local organisations officially claims to be neutral and apolitical, to be open to all Eritreans, to not mix in politics and not to have contacts with the embassy or the regime. Other respondents strongly doubt these claims.
There are strong indications that a large number of these organisations have been infiltrated or taken over by the PFDJ in the past years. Many board members or active members of these organisations profile themselves as active PFDJ or YPFDJ members and/or pursue the goals of the PFDJ openly. The embassy and the PFDJ, which operates from within the embassy, plays an important role in the monitoring or direct management of the organisations, according to many respondents. The embassy itself denies this and argues that it offers support.
Those that have developed new initiatives have all experienced, to a certain extent, warnings, threats, intimidation and attempts to infiltrate or take over. For some of these organisations, these attempts have succeeded, while others have stopped and others have stayed neutral. Some have actively jjoined the opposition and have broken all ties.

In Eritrea, the Orthodox church falls under the authority of the PFDJ and according to many respondents, this is equally the case in the Netherlands. Official churches are managed from within Eritrea and operated by priests that have been educated there. Among the churches that are part of the Eritrean Orthodox church under the authority of the PFDJ are the churches in Rotterdam, Amstelveen, Leiden, Utrecht, Alkmaar and Eindhoven. Besides these, there are other locations of which some are recent and still informal in character.

An important task of the PFDJ – and the organisations, movements and churches allied to the PFDJ – is the collection of finance in the form of taxes or other translations (the 2% diaspora tax, contributions, donations, etc.).
The collection is organised mainly through gatherings, large parties, festivals and concerts. Very large amounts are involved and the pressure to meet these large amounts is being increased substantially.
A former minister of Finance of Eritrea and former leaders of the YPFDJ in Europe and the Netherlands assert that the collection of finances is one of the most important goals of the organisations in the diaspora. The total amount of revenues includes, alongside the contribution of members, the subsidies that the organisations in question receive. The management of the finances of the YPFDJ is executed by the embassy, led by the head of the political department of the PFDJ in Eritrea.

  1. What are the relations among the organisations and movements; management, cooperation and influence, also from within Eritrea?

The various organisations do not cooperate substantially. The cooperation is being hampered by the strong mistrust within the community. People always bear in mind the possible affinity towards the regime and potential infiltration of supporters.
The supporters of the regime are well organised within the diaspora and try to exert influence over the local communities. YPFDJ plays an important role in this. The supporters of the regime respond quickly, explicitly and fiercely to any criticism and opposition.
The opposition is more fragmented in its organisation than the supporters of the regime. The various opposition movements do work together, for example in the organisation of demonstrations. Recently, the opposition in the Netherlands has started to form a collective organisation in order to form a platform and a point of contact. Beyond its political goals, this platform wants to form a meeting place for members of the opposition through socio-cultural activities (as a counterpart to the parties of the YPFDJ) and to support new arrivals.
Individuals that form initiatives specifically aimed at support and assistance to the third migration wave, without a political message, experience disruption by the strong politicisation.

  1. What is the influence of these ties on the community in the Netherlands?

The entire network of organisations is in constant motion. Refugees from the third migration wave found their own organisations, partly because they fear the influence of the regime within existing organisations. Within the Orthodox church, groups split off to found their own churches – independent from the regime. Other churches within the Netherlands are being reached out to. Many of our respondents are under the impression that the influence of the PFDJ and YPFDJ is somewhat reduced by the large number of newcomers that have come to the Netherlands recently, in the third migration wave. Nevertheless, the entire situation in the Eritrean community remains strongly politicised: neutral does not exist. According to the regime and its supporters, neutral means ‘against Eritrea’ and according to the opposition, neutral means ‘pro-PFDJ’. There is, however, a large silent group: they are afraid, keep their mouths shut and do not want to stand out. The refugees from the third migration wave often feel misunderstood by the refugees from the first wave. They often mistrust the first migration wave. A part of the third migration wave has the tendency, for various reasons, to withdraw within their own group. However, initiatives where Dutch volunteers and care workers cooperate with refugees and counsellors that have lived in the Netherlands for a longer period of time, such as cultural mediators, show positive developments.

  1. What is the vision of the organisations and movements regarding their role in socio-cultural and socio-economic integration of Eritreans in the Netherlands?
    1. What is the vision of these movements and organisations on the integration in Dutch society?

All organisations and respondents view education and learning the Dutch language as a precondition to integration. Additionally, the supports of the regime see maintaining of good ties with Eritrea as important. As a refugee, you are responsible for contributing to Eritrea. This also explains why the supports are not involved much with the newcomers. They are being seen as traitors to the country.
One the one hand, organisations of the opposition try to achieve political change in Eritrea and on the other hand, they want to help newcomers settle down in the Netherlands. They offer concrete help (building trust, mediation, language and communication, and information about the Netherlands (the civil rights according to participation policy). According to them, this is unrelated to their opposition activities. Members of the community that do not want to voice a political opinion – for example out of fear for the consequences to their family in Eritrea – often do not want to be associated with the opposition. Organisations that are neutral are aimed at activities that promote integration, as mentioned above. They do not want to associate this with politics.

  1. How do the organisations advance socio-cultural and socio-economic integration and participation?

This sub-question was partly covered above. Although the majority of local organisations indicated that they want to advance integration with their activities, we can ask ourselves whether, and in how far, the activities for mainly their own Eritrean community (bonding) contribute to integration (binding). However, we have also encountered several activities that are aimed more at the Dutch society. This mostly concerns activities such as learning the Dutch language, practical skills, support and concrete help that do promote integration.

  1. Which concerns exist with regard to integration and participation of the members and especially the integration and participation of the younger generation and how is this being handled?

With regard to the first migration wave, the responses of the respondents mainly point at concerns about women and the less educated. Their command of Dutch is often poor and they are often dependent on social welfare payments. This group is sensitive to pressure and intimidation, is afraid and stays silent due to fear and mistrust.
The children of this first wave of refugees – the second generation – often do well in the area of  integration. There is a group, however, that despite good education is experiencing problems on the job market and deal with racism and discrimination. This is the group that is receptive to recruitment by the YPFDJ.
The situation of the second migration wave is comparable to the first.
It is the third migration wave that is the main source of concern for everyone. These concerns relate to mistrust, the enormous cultural gap, the low level of education and the immense trauma: trauma sustained in Eritrea, trauma en route and trauma related to family left behind. Furthermore, a lot of pressure comes from financial burdens. This includes pressure from the Dutch society, for example to obtain the correct papers, but also financial pressure to somehow pay one’s own escape journey and/or those of others. This group has been confronted with human trafficking of near relatives, spouses and children, the extortions that follow and the insecurity that these situations cause.
Severe forms of trauma (including sexual trauma) form a serious obstacle for integration and participation. The symptoms of trauma can manifest in many different ways. Sometimes, this can lead to the use of extremely traditional religious customs that are often poorly understood and recognised in the Netherlands. The refugees have little faith in discussing trauma and rely upon traditional structures such as the Orthodox churches.
On the other hand, this group is also characterised by a strong motivation to learn the Dutch language and start working. This differs from the first migration wave in which most refugees invested little time in integration and participation early on, as they assumed that they would ‘be going back to Eritrea soon anyway’.

  1. What are the experiences and opinions of Eritreans about the pressure from the Eritrean community and the diaspora tax?
  1. Do they experience pressure (deliberately or otherwise) or do they feel intimidated and/or threatened in the Netherlands, and if yes, what is the nature (political, religious, etc.) and the extent of this pressure?

 We have already commented on it: a lot of fear and mistrust exist within the community. The majority of the community experiences pressure. The pressure that is experienced is a sliding scale, which varies from implicit and subtle to explicit and in the form of threats and violence. It resembles a pyramid-shape. On the lowest level, many members of the community experience some pressure and a small part of the community personally experiences the most severe forms of intimidation.
The pressure, however, is not only determined by personal experiences, but clearly also by the information circulating in the community about intimidation. The trust in the rule of law, as we know it in the Netherlands, is being undermined by fear for reprisals, even if one has not experienced such reprisals directly.
The majority of the respondents was dealing with the implicit and subtle forms of pressure.  People keep their mouths shut and/or pay taxes in order to prevent something happening to their family in Eritrea (‘what if…’). The reason this subtle pressure works depends on the more explicit forms of pressure. This is where pressure becomes intimidation. Again, this can range from lighter forms to more severe intimidations and threats. This report covers this pressure – from light to severe – extensively.

This research shows that despite the barriers caused by this fear, notifications and reports of crimes are being filed. Notifications and police reports are related to (1) assault; (2) rape; (3)  disappearances; (4) (reported) suicide; (5) extortion in relation to human smuggling and trafficking; (6) extortion n relation to payment of the diaspora tax and other ‘voluntary’ contributions, and (7) intimidation.
The pressure and intimidation is therefore considered by us as a proven and established fact. In combination with:

  • the normal migration and integration issues (different language, culture, climate, surroundings),
  • the enormous amounts of trauma with many – if not most – migrants from the third wave, and
  • the lack of understanding and mistrust between the migration waves and between generations

this pressure and intimidation leads to serious integration issues.

  1. What opinion do they have on the diaspora tax, how is it collected and what is the role of different bodies and organisations in this?

The embassy sees the tax as a voluntary contribution of 2% that is being sought without any pressure or coercion, in order to support the needs of the victims of the 30-year long struggle for independence (widows, orphans and war invalids).
However, we can raise question marks around the voluntary nature.

  • Firstly, the tax must be paid if one wants to make use of consular services.
  • Secondly, the payments must be made for a variety of affairs related to the situation and the family in Eritrea (for example a funeral of close relatives).
  • Thirdly, ‘voluntary’ is a fairly relative term within the context of a climate of fear, mistrust and intimidation.

The diaspora tax and financial contributions rather seem to be part of a system of fear and intimidation.
It is notable that the tax plays a lesser role for the third migration wave, because this group is not required to use the services of the embassy for their procedure. However, many problems do arise for situations of family reunion. An early detection of circumstances is of vital importance here.
The following is also of consideration for the diaspora tax and other contributions:

  • there is abuse of power by use of extortion, because the provision of consular services is being made contingent on payment for other purposes; this is in contravention to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;
  • the purposes of the collection of finances – even if it is marked as a voluntary contribution at the parties – are not specific and the realisation of the goals is not knowable;
  • collection is aimed at specific services (one goal is for example building houses, but thus far, no houses have been built with the money that was collected), or the money is being used for completely different unknown goals.
  • there is no insight into the question to what extent the reconstruction of Eritrea is being reached through the use of the collected finances, due to the lack of public financial management (there is no budget, no treasury, no independent central bank).

For these same reasons, it cannot be known if and how these contributions can be used for possible military goals in the region, nor prevented can the use of contributions for military goals be prevented. This conclusion was recently drawn again by the UN Monitoring Group and it is in contravention to the weapons embargo that was placed on Eritrea by the UN Security Council.

Source=https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2016/12/16/eritrea-evidence-of-shoot-to-kill-policy-as-group-gunned-down/

 

Notice of death of on border Asmara, smuggled out by Freedom Friday

Notice of death of on border Asmara, smuggled out by Freedom Friday

Pasted on a wall in the capital, Asmara: an announcement every family fears – the death of a loved one.

But this invitation for friends and family to pay their respects does not carry the usual announcement of where and when the funeral will take place. There was none.

This evidence was smuggled out of Eritrea by the underground resistance.

The network: Arbi Harnet or Freedom Friday, risk their lives in this most closed society to get the story published.

Martin


Eritrea: Border Patrol officers shoot and kill young people fleeing to Sudan

(Asmara 12/12/2016)

On 22nd of October a light pickup truck left the city of Asmara carrying 7 young people and 3 children.

Each had paid $5,500 to be smuggled across the Eirtrea – Sudan border.

Seven of those aboard the truck were absconding national service recruits (5 women and 2 men).

The three children (accompanied by an uncle) were on their way to join their mother who had previously fled from the country.

At the town of Hykota, a short distance from the border, they were ambushed.

The truck was hit by a hail of bullets in a co-ordinated attack ordered by a senior divisional commander.

Many were killed outright; others fatally wounded.

Among the dead was a young woman, Yohana Kahsay. Just 26 years old, she had one of the three small children on her lap.

Yohana was a member of the 26th round of national service recruits who had been conscripted into the army. She had served with the 74th mechanised division for over two years.

Following the carnage the wounded were loaded back on a truck, while soldiers went to hunt down those who had fled for their lives.

No attempt was made to try to care for the wounded.

Residents of Hykota report that the soldiers even stopped at a local teashop on their way to the hospital, by which time everyone was pronounced dead.

Families of the victims were not informed and they were hurriedly buried.

It took each family weeks to piece together what had happened.

Without the bodies of their loved ones they were left to grieve without the comfort of a normal funeral and the associated rituals.

These killings have shaken the residents of Asmara where all the people were from, and where their fateful journey began.

This report was compiled by Freedom Friday () activists stationed in the vicinity of the incident.

They have a complete picture of the massacre including the name of the officer in charge of the operation.

This information will be passed to relevant authorities to hold them to account.

 

 
fromEuropean Commission
Published on15 Dec 2016http://img.static.reliefweb.int/profiles/reliefweb/themes/kobe/images/icon-external-link.png) 0px 0px no-repeat transparent;">View Original

European Commission - Press release

Brussels, 15 December 2016

The European Union invests €170 million to tackle instability and irregular migration in the Horn of Africa

The European Commission has today approved a package of 11 new actions under the EU Trust Fund for Africa to improve stability and address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement in the Horn of Africa region.

Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica, said: "This new set of actions worth almost €170 million is yet another proof of our decisive action to tackle the root causes of instability and irregular migration. With activities on the ground up and running, we have already seen the real value of the EU Trust Fund's for the Horn of Africa. With these new actions, we are steaming ahead to provide sustainable support to the many refugees, displaced persons and host communities in the region. They will allow people to sustainably improve their lives in the region instead of risking their lives in the hands of traffickers and smugglers."

Fourth package of actions in the Horn of Africa under the EU Trust Fund The package of 11 actions for an amount of almost €170 million consists of: regional projects to build the capacities of countries of the Horn of Africa to manage migration, including to fight against human trafficking and smuggling of migrants and through the development of rights-based and sustainable return and reintegration policies (€30 million); a project in three cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan to address the drivers of instability and forced displacement, and support cross-border peaceful cooperation and sustainable economic growth (€63.5 million); support to refugees and host communities in northern Uganda, in response to the recent large-scale influx from South Sudan (€10 million); projects creating employment opportunities to address socio-economic grievances of young people in Kenya, Djibouti and Eritrea (totalling €25 million). For example, in Djibouti 3,000 people will be trained with relevant skills to access the job market; 75% are expected to have found employment within 6 months of the training; support to the people in Sudan, with three projects to address instability and forced displacement through resilience actions to improve access to, and quality of, primary education, benefitting 90,000 children and training 2,000 teachers country-wide (€22 million), strengthen livelihoods in Southern and Eastern regions (€9 million) and enhance nutrition of 400,000 women and children in North-Eastern Sudan (€8 million); a regional monitoring and learning system (€2 million) to complement the on-going Research and Evidence Facility which is expected to include (but not be limited to) information on the drivers of migration, dynamics of cross-border economies and centre/periphery relations, drivers of radicalism and violent extremism.

These actions will build on previous packages of actions worth €253 million, €117 million, and €66.5 million package committed under the EU Trust Fund in the last 12 months to tackle instability and the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; all of which are part of an ongoing response to the commitments made by the EU and African partners at the Valletta migration summit of November 2015.

Background

The European Commission launched an “Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa” at the Valletta migration summit in November 2015. The Fund is made up of over €2.4 billion from the EU budget and European Develop­ment Fund, combined with contributions from EU Member States and other donors.

For More Information FACTSHEET: Third package of measures approved to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement in the Horn of Africa

On the Trust Fund for Africa:https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-af...

Website of Commissioner Neven Mimica:http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/mimica_en

IP/16/4424

Source=http://reliefweb.int/report/eritrea/european-commission-press-release-european-union-invests-170-million-tackle

Posted byACN Newson 14/12/2016, 8:59 am
Board Administrator

ACN News: Wednesday, 14th December 2016 – ERITREA

Giving hope to Eritrean Refugees in Hitsatse Camp in Ethiopia

By Magdalena Wolnik


We hear about them in the news, in reports about successive boats that have sunk in the Mediterranean Sea. They come from a country where there is no war, and yet considered one of the worst places in which to be born and to live. Many risk much to flee the country. For us they are anonymous numbers that have long ceased to awaken any great emotions. Fr Hagos Hadgu, a project partner with the Catholic charity Aid to the Church in Need (ACN), knows many of their names and faces.

In 2015 about 50 thousand Eritreans reached Europe to become one of the largest national refugee groups, after the Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans in whose countries bloody wars are an everyday reality. Before they reach Europe, the USA or Canada, Eritreans pass through Ethiopia; one of Africa’s most hospitable countries, presently caring for about 800,000 refugees. Though some 10 million native people are starving here, they still continue to welcome those fleeing from neighbouring Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea. About 120,000 Eritreans have sought refuge in four camps located in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region.

Ethiopian Camps receive 300 people every day. Many of the refugees are young, educated men, fleeing the prospect of endless military service. Fr Hadgu Hagos, a Catholic priest of the Ethiopian Rite who, together with Fr Ghiday Alema, visits refugee camps in Shimelba, Mai-Aini and Hitsatse every week, warns that a good number of the refugees are often minors and even unaccompanied children.


(Fr Hadgu and Eritrean Catholics in the chapel at the Hitsatse Camp © Aid to the Church in Need)

Hitsatse camp, surrounded by a mountainous desert, situated more than 70km from the nearest town, with its hundreds of simple brick barracks and shabby UNHCR tents, is home to many large multigenerational families. Humanitarian organizations work here, focusing on providing access to drinking water and food, children’s education, support for people with disabilities and women suffering from abuse. There is also the spiritual dimension, which is why the camp has several chapels: Orthodox and Catholic, as well as a Muslim place of prayer. The camp numbers 25 thousand people, with a tiny Catholic community. The camp at Shimelba – 128 km from Shire town – has over five thousand Catholics and is better organised with youth groups and catechists. In the camps Fr Hagos and Fr Ghiday from the Adigrat Eparchy perform the sacraments, and together with catechists, prepare those who request it to be baptised, catechize, visit families, and play ball with the young.


(UNHCR tents at the Hitsatse camp © Aid to the Church in Nee

“People having suffered psychological deprivation, need consolation, reconciliation, you have to care for them, work with them. You have to tell them about God” - explains Fr Hagos, as he opens a modest chapel in the Hitsatse camp; accompanied by an old dried out man in oversized glasses, who explains that although he worked at the American Embassy in Asmara, he has been waiting for a visa for over three years. And yet he remains hopeful and confident, that he will soon be able to fly to the US with his wife. He adds that they could not have survived all this, without their faith. “We left everything behind, but we came here with our catholic faith. And thanks to the camp chapel we can continue to express it. There are no Catholics in the surrounding area, when people come here and see the chapel, they are filled with hope. We gather around this church, and thereby also express our gratitude to Aid to the Church in Need (ACN), for building it.”

Eritrean Christians need to have strong faith. Fr Hagos explains that these persecutions and illegal border crossings leave people traumatised. They have to sell all they have to pay the soldiers at the checkpoints. When they reach the camps, they have almost nothing to survive on. A sense of hopelessness, frustration and depression is common, aggravated by separation from family, longing, idleness, and an uncertain future. The consequences are often drug and alcohol addiction, and suicide.

“If they fail to earn money to pay the smugglers and leave, life in the camp ceases to have any sense for them. They begin to hate themselves. I saw a girl who set fire to herself in the camp”, recalls Fr Hagos. “They can’t stand the tension. But they rarely talk what they have experienced in the camp and on the road.”

The majority do not intend to stay in Ethiopia, faced with drought and famine, with no prospects for work and a normal life. The legal road involves waiting for a visa to Europe, the USA or Canada. Four families a week receive them. But the queue is long and the wait time ranges from 3 to 7 years. Older people, unable to face the challenge and hardships of the journey, have to wait to be relocated, and are more often than not left to their own devices. Young people on the other hand, impatient and not prepared to waste the best years of their lives, undertake the risky journey through desert and the Mediterranean Sea. Illegal routes to Europe lead through Sudan, Egypt, Libya and the Italian island of Lampedusa.

“The young move me”, declares Fr Hagos “they often wait, sometimes for years, without any certainty about their future. They dream of a better life. We try to convince them against choosing the illegal option, but if they are desperate they decide to go and risk it. Sometimes someone disappears, only for us to learn, several months later, that the boys with whom we played football, who served at the altar, had drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. One day, we lost 16 such boys. Their relatives cried, and I cried with them. One of them was Tadese, a bright and capable young lad, a contentious student, who encouraged other young people to get involved with the Church. We liked to joke together… He drowned in the Mediterranean Sea last year. I can still see his face…”

Before ACN carried out the construction of the chapel to cover spiritual and psychosocial needs of the Catholic refugees living in Hitsatse camp, the community was celebrating Holy Mass under the trees. In 2015 the Catholic charity supported projects in Ethiopia with more than $3.2 million.


(The recently completed chapel at the Hitsatse camp © Aid to the Church in Need)


BACKGROUND INFO:

According to some sources 20% of Eritrea’s population of five million have fled the country since independence - 5,000 people every month. Even the national football team exploited an away match to flee. So far, almost all have sought, and have received political refugee status, though as a consequence of Europe’s refugee crisis, only a third presently succeed; the remainder risk being sent back to Asmara to face a military tribunal ready to sentence them for desertion.
Why do they flee? Eritrea, which gained independence in 1993 after a 30-year guerrilla war with Ethiopia, is considered to have one of the most repressive and ruthless regimes in the world. Authors of the 2015 UN Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea accuse the authorities of crimes against humanity, including murder, torture, rape and slavery. The country, inaccessible to outside observers, is reminiscent of a military barracks. There are no independent courts, newspapers or foreign correspondents, whilst the fictitious parliament deliberated for the last time in 2002. Every male between 17 and 70 years of age is required to enter military service, likewise all unmarried woman. Citizens are called to serve for indefinite periods of time, sometimes for a dozen or more years.
This young country, unceasingly at war with its neighbours, and despite the overwhelming poverty of its inhabitants, spends around 20 percent of its GDP on arms. The average wage is $30 a month, whilst the prices of basic goods can grow to absurd levels often overnight. From among 187 listed, the country is 182nd on the Human Development Index (HDI). Wojciech Jagielski, from the Polish Press Agency (PAP), notes that the West has no instruments with which to put pressure on Asmara. It cannot withhold loans, investments, or food aid, because it has granted Eritrea neither.

Human Rights Watch describes Eritrea as a “Big Prison for Christians”. America’s Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) reports that over two thousand people are detained in labour camps because of their faith, including Patriarch Antonios, still recognised as leader of the country’s Orthodox Church, who has been imprisoned for over eight years. The few witnesses in the camps report that beatings and torture are aimed at inducing inmates to renounce their faith.


Editor’s Notes

Directly under the Holy See, Aid to the Church in Need supports the faithful wherever they are persecuted, oppressed or in pastoral need. ACN is a Catholic charity – helping to bring Christ to the world through prayer, information and action.
The charity undertakes thousands of projects every year including providing transport for clergy and lay Church workers, construction of church buildings, funding for priests and nuns and help to train seminarians. Since the initiative’s launch in 1979, Aid to the Church in Need’s Child’s Bible – God Speaks to his Children has been translated into 172 languages and 50 million copies have been distributed all over the world.
While ACN gives full permission for the media to freely make use of the charity’s press releases, please acknowledge ACN as the source of stories when using the material.

For more information or to make a donation to help the work of Aid to the Church in Need, please contact the Australian office of ACN on (02) 9679-1929. e-mail: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or write to Aid to the Church in Need PO Box 7246 Baulkham Hills BC NSW 2153.

On Line donations can be made atwww.aidtochurch.org

Source=http://members4.boardhost.com/acnaus/msg/1481673553.html

European officials under pressure to cut migration should have learned by now that ignoring human rights violations is unlikely to succeed

 
Eritrean refugee children play at a refugee camp in the Tigrai region in Ethiopia.
Eritrean refugee children play at a refugee camp in the Tigrai region in Ethiopia. Photograph: Tiksa Negeri/Reuters

As the European parliament hosts another Eritrean politician in the hope of reducing the number of refugees fleeing the small African state, the fact that the regime has been found guilty of “crimes against humanity” by the UN has once again been overlooked.

The event, organised by Irish MEP Brian Hayes and attended by Eritrea’s minister of information, Yemane Gebremeskel, is the latest example of the EU’s attempts to tackle the refugee crisis by reaching out to repressive regimes.

Since the small Red Sea nation gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Europe has made repeated attempts to build a relationship with the government, but to no avail. Which leaves open the question: what crime must Eritrea commit to be condemned by the international community?

In 2001 when the president, Isaias Afwerki, cracked down on all political opposition and jailed more than 10 independent journalists, the Italian ambassador to Eritrea presented a letter of protest to the authorities. He was promptly expelled and other European ambassadors were withdrawn. The EU presidency said relations between the EU and Eritrea had been “seriously undermined”.

At first Europe demanded that Eritrea improve its human rights record before normal relations could be resumed. But President Afwerki did nothing of the sort, assuming that he could outlast the EU’s anger. He was right: it was the Europeans who buckled.

President Isaias Afwerki.
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President Isaias Afwerki. Photograph: Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah/Reuters

 

As time passed the EU reassessed its relations with Asmara. Although there had been no sign of movement on human rights it was decided to try to have a “new beginning” with Eritrea.

In May 2007 the president was invited to visit Brussels and was warmly welcomed by the then EU development commissioner, Louis Michel.

By August 2009 Michel was sufficiently encouraged that progress could be made that he visited Asmara, after receiving assurances from an Eritrean diplomat that Dawit Isaak, a Swedish-Eritrean journalist imprisoned in 2001, would be released into his care. Having booked a ticket for Isaak to return with him to Europe, Michel flew to Asmara.

But once he arrived it became apparent that the president had no intention of allowing the journalist to go free. Michel was not even permitted to visit the prisoner and returned home humiliated.

Despite these setbacks, the EU remained wedded to attempting to improve its relationship with Eritrea.

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In 2009, European and American diplomats discussed whether to strengthen military sanctions against the country. A US diplomatic cable, released via WikiLeaks, revealed that EU representatives called for engagement with Eritrea rather than isolation.

The Italians described Eritrea as governed by a “brutal dictator” and noted that it had “not gotten results from its efforts at engagement”, while at the same time cautioning against “creating another Afghanistan” by imposing sanctions. The French said that while engagement was “useless”, they would continue on this track as there was no other option.

The then US deputy assistant secretary for African affairs, Karl Wycoff, pointed out that EU policy was contradictory. Wycoff described what he called “the inconsistency between the private acknowledgment that Asmara was not only playing a spoiler role” by supporting Islamist groups in Somalia, which contained “violent, anti-west elements”, and the continued provision of aid programmes to Eritrea. He also noted that strong actions, including sanctions, were needed to have a chance of changing Afwerki’s behaviour.

Ignoring these concerns, the EU pressed ahead with its strategy of engagement.

Migrants, most from Eritrea, jump into the water during a rescue operation off Libya in August.
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Migrants, most from Eritrea, jump into the water during a rescue operation off Libya in August. Photograph: Emilio Morenatti/AP

 

Years on, human rights violations and indefinite conscription continue to drive 4,000-5,000 Eritreans beyond its borders every month. Many arrive on European shores: in 2015 a total of 38,791 crossed the Mediterranean, according to the European border agency Frontex, arriving mostly in Italy.

The refugee question has become so toxic that a number of European states have been attempting again to establish a “new engagement” with Asmara. In 2014 the Danish government sent officials to the country. Their report, published by the Danish Immigration Service, concluded that “the human rights situation in Eritrea may not be as bad as rumoured”.

The report was not well received. It was alleged to be inaccurate and misquoted its key academic source. Prof Gaim Kibreab, whose work featured heavily, said he felt betrayed by the way in which it was used. “I was shocked and very surprised …They have completely ignored facts and just hand-plucked certain information,” he said.

Despite these allegations, the report was picked up by a number of European nations, including the UK. Britain sent its own officials to Asmara who returned with similar conclusions.

In March 2015 the UK’s position dramatically changed after the Home Office published updated country guidance suggesting a marked improvement in Eritrea’s human rights. The acceptance rate for Eritrean refugees plummeted from 84% in 2014 to 44% in 2015. However, the courts reportedly overturned 92%of the cases they heard.

The EU is now attempting to deal with Eritrea as part of a wider African initiative to end refugee flows. In 2015 EU leaders met their African counterparts in Malta. The action plan they adopted detailed how Europe would co-operate with African nations to fight “irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings”.

This was reinforced last year by the announcement of a possible €200m aid deal for Eritrea. A consensus had developed in European foreign ministries that the country was about to abandon one of the main driver of refugees: indefinite conscription. It was an illusion that would soon be shattered.

In February Reuters published a report quoting unnamed EU diplomats who accused Eritrea of “back-tracking on privately made commitments by some officials last year to fix national service at 18 months”. Afwerki had done what he has done so often in the past: allowed his officials to give assurances to gain international leverage, only to pull the rug from under them at the last moment.

Eritrea’s capital, Asmara.
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Eritrea’s capital, Asmara. Photograph: Thomas Mukoya/Reuters

 

In May, Der Spiegel reported that Germany was leading the way in reducing refugee flows from Eritrea. The magazine said that the European commission had warned that “under no circumstances” should the public learn what was being discussed.

Under the heading “risks and assumptions”, an assessment drawn up by EU officials listed “provision of equipment and trainings [sic] to sensitive national authorities (such as security services or border management) diverted for repressive aims; criticism by NGOs and civil society for engaging with repressive governments on migration (particularly in Eritrea and Sudan)”.

It is apparent that European officials – pressed by politicians to reduce migration – have learned little from their failures. Although they have acknowledged that attempts to engage with the Eritrean regime are ineffective, they see no alternative but to deal with the regime.

This is an edited extract from Martin Plaut’s new book, Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa’s Most Repressive State, published by Hurst Publishers

 

African Union Press Release

Sunday, 11 December 2016 07:03 Written by

THE AU CALLS FOR A SPEEDY, ORDERLY AND PEACEFUL TRANSITION AND TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN THE GAMBIA

Published09 December 2016 |  

Reuters
A North Korean flag is seen on the top of its embassy in Beijing, China, February 7, 2016.

Ahead of Genocide Prevention Day on 9 December, Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) is calling for the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in North Korea and Eritrea to be held to account, either through referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or other judicial mechanisms.

Commissions of inquiry mandated by the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) to assess the human rights situations in North Korea and Eritrea found evidence of crimes against humanity and called for judicial processes to hold the perpetrators of these mass atrocities to account and to give victims a voice. However, this has not been acted upon in either case.

The UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea found that the gravity, scale and nature of human rights violations in North Korea reveal a State that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea (COIE) found that crimes against humanity have been underway in the country since 1991 as Eritrean officials engaged in a persistent, widespread and systematic attack against the country's civilian population.

CSW's Chief Executive Mervyn Thomas said, "Atrocity crimes persist and are entrenched by the impunity that arises when we fail to hold perpetrators to account. In this regard, the reports by these Commissions amount to a call to action for the international community, through the UN, to either recommend an ICC referral or to establish alternative justice mechanisms in order to identify and prosecute perpetrators, and to give the victims of these atrocities a voice and a hope of justice."

The International Day of Commemoration and Dignity of the Victims of the Crime of Genocide and of the Prevention of this Crime falls on 9 December to coincide with the signing of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Customary international law, and treaties such as the Genocide Convention and the 1998 Rome Statute that established the ICC identify genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as atrocity crimes that the international community must prevent and punish.

CSW continues to call for international investigations to establish whether the grave human rights violations targeting minority communities in Syria and Burma amount to atrocity crimes, and for effective interventions in the event of positive determinations. A UN investigation found that genocide has been committed by Daesh (Islamic State) against the Yazidis in Iraq and Syria; however, the situation for Christians and other religious and ethnic minorities has yet to be established. In Burma, there are serious allegations of grave violations of human rights, including crimes against humanity, in Rakhine State, which have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Rohingya Muslims and the displacement of at least 30,000. Reports indicate that the Burmese military has committed severe violations against Rohingya Muslims including the burning of homes, mass rape, torture, extrajudicial killings and blocking of aid. Hundreds of Rohingya Muslims have fled to the Bangladeshi border but have been denied asylum.

Courtesy ofChristian Solidarity Worldwide

Source=http://www.christiantoday.com.au/article/csw.calls.for.perpetrators.of.crimes.against.humanity.in.north.korea.eritrea.to.be.held.accountable/23239.htm

Effective December 1, 2016, the Acting Deputy Chairperson of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) has designated refugee claims from Eritrea as eligible for processing under the Policy on the Expedited Processing of Refugee Claims by the Refugee Protection Division.

The purpose of the policy is to enable the RPD to meet its mandate of making refugee status determinations fairly and efficiently by accepting claims without a hearing in appropriate circumstances.

The policy was first issued by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada on September 18, 2015, and since that time, claims from Syria and Iraq have also been designated as eligible for processing under the policy."

December 5, 2016 at 3:14 pm | Published in: Africa, Egypt, Iran, Middle East, News, Saudi Arabia, Yemen

Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf of Djibouti [Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Flickr]
Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf of Djibouti [Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Flickr]

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